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defense supported by evidence which did not convince the jury, the verdict being guilty of second degree murder. On appeal the court of appeals determined that the record did not support a finding of a purpose
to kill, but the issue of self-defense had been properly submitted to the
jury and their verdict indicated that the defendant had not sustained his
burden of proof on this issue. The court of appeals then proceeded to
modify the degree of guilt from murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first degree, affirmed the judgment as modified, and
remanded to the common pleas court for sentence.
The writ of habeas corpus continues to be used in a desperate effort
to secure release from imprisonment. Cases heretofore discussed under
other issues provide illustrations of its use, both under the original jurisdictions of the courts of common pleas and the appellate courts. Recentof
ly efforts to secure release on the theory that the alleged incompetence 122
counsel has resulted in a denial of a fair trial have been unsuccessful.
Kramer v. AlVis 1 23 is another example of its unsuccessful use on the
ground that petitioner was denied his constitutional right to counsel because of the alleged incompetence and ineptness of court appointed counsel. In this case, Kramer made his application to the court of common
pleas where judgment granting the writ was entered despite the statutory
provision 124 against allowance of the writ of habeas corpus where it appears that the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the
person and subject matter. The Supreme Court of Ohio has long held
where the
that the writ of habeas corpus is not a proper mode of redress
12 5
trial court had jurisdiction of the crime and the person.
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sonal injuries. Prior to trial the plaintiff
defendant to file a report of the result of
plaintiff which was made by defendant's

Company' was a suit for perfiled a -motion to compel the
a physical examination of the
physician. The motion was

'Beard v. Alvis, 164 Ohio St. 488, 132 N.E.2d 96 (1956).
103 Ohio App. 324, 141 N.E.2d 489 (1956).
OHIO Rnv. CoDE § 2725.05. This statute was given literal application by the
Supreme Court in Yutze v. Copelan, 109 Ohio St. 171, (1923).
'Ex Parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 80 (1857); Ex Parte Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 426
(1874). The opinion in Ex parte Shaw was outspoken in its condemnation of an
alleged practice in parts of Ohio of using the writ of habeas corpus as a short and
summary mode of reviewing as upon a writ of error, and annulling the sentences of
courts, as "an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus which cannot be too soon corrected."
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denied. A defendant has the right, before trial, to an examination of
the plaintiff -by a physician selected by the court upon the defendant's
nomination in order to determine the extent and nature of the damage suffered •by the plaintiff. Had the report 'been filed with the clerk of court;
it would have been open to -the -plaintiff and to the public. There is no
reason for plaintiff to ,be furnished this information. Furthermore, the
examination should be "a ;reasonable private physical examination" as
the plaintiff as well as the defendant may be interested in privacy in such
a matter and -interested in not having the results of -the examination
"memorialized in a court record."
Miller v. Loy 2 held, in a personal injury case, that failure to instruct
the jury -that mortality tables which had been submitted in evidence were
not conclusive in determining the life expectancy of the plaintiff "was
an error of omission and not prejudicial."
DeTunno v. Shull3 was a suit by a father to recover for medical
expenses incurred in providing treatment for his son as the result of injuries allegedly suffered -in an automobile accident. The father testified
as to the amount of the bills rendered to 'him. He also offered to submit the bills -into evidence but these were not allowed. There was no
testimony by professional witnesses as to the fact of the rendering of bills
or the reasonableness thereof. This was assigned as error. The court
held that "there was sufficient evidence aside from the bills -themselves
to go to the jury for their consideration upon this -hase of plaintiff's
claim.... To sustain plaintiff's claim, it is unnecessary to bolster it by
introducing expert testimony tending to show the reasonable value of
such services." 4 The court distinguished the personal injury claim from
a claim to recover for professional services for which "expert testimony is
requisite." On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed 'because of
the failure of -the testimony to establish the reasonableness of the charges
and the necessity for the medical services rendered but did not challenge
the court of appeals proposition as stated above. 5
In Tradlerv. Young,6 it was held that when a jury returned a verdict
in excess of the damages requested by 'the 'plaintiff it was not error for
the trial judge to grant a remittitur in the amount of 'the excess and
enter judgment for the remainder. The court said: '"We find no authority for the holding that a verdict in excess of the amount prayed
1139 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio C.P. 1949).

2 101 Ohio App. 405, 140 N.E.2d 38 (1956).
' 144 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
"Id. at 674.
'DeTunno v. Shull, 166 Ohio St. 365, 143 N.E.2d 301 (1957).
'145 NE.2d 456 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).

